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1. Introduction    
Nowadays, Internet is the usual platform for people around the world to search for firms 
offering specific services. However, many Internet search engines provide useless lists due 
to the fact that they are extremely long or not very well organized. This has been the starting 
point for some Internet search service providers to create new systems for ranking firms 
according to different searching engines. 
One outstanding example of these providers is the giant Google. Google has developed an 
auction mechanism (see, for example, (Krishna, 2002) or (Klemperer, 2004) for details on 
auction mechanisms) for firms to advertise their services on the Internet, known as Google 
Adwords system. Under this mechanism, when a consumer searches for firms offering 
specific services, the results for a particular keyword (or group of keywords) are ranked in 
descending order according to what previously the firms have bid. Then, when a consumer 
clicks on the name of the firm listed on the search site, this firm has to pay the provider an 
amount equal to the bid price regardless of whether the consumer finally purchases or not. 
This way of ranking firms has several benefits over other possibilities. On one hand, the 
provider offers pay-for performance service since firms pay only when a consumer clicks on 
their corresponding hyperlink. On the other hand, each firm is encouraged submitting a 
new bid anytime to change the order at which it appears on the list. 
This issue has been studied previously in the literature. (Lim & Tang, 2006) introduced a 
one-stage game for two firms that captures the advertising mechanism of a search service 
provider. So, game theory allowed them to analyze the firm’s optimal bidding strategy and 
assess the impact of several parameters on the provider’s revenue. Nevertheless, it just was 
the first attempt to analyse bidding behaviour arising from this type of situations, since their 
model presents several limitations. First, Lim and Tang’s model is limited to only two firms, 
each one with just three feasible bids. Secondly, Lim and Tang’s model does not take into 
account the dynamic interactions among firms (e.g., fluctuating coalition structures) since 
they assume just one stage. For these reasons, it seems suitable to extend the analysis of 
(Lim & Tang, 2006) to other more complex situations.  
In this chapter we describe software which could be used as a decision support system tool 
or framework for analysing, at least from an academic point of view, ranking auction 
markets for Internet search service providers. The software tool is based on the behaviour of 
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the firms in a realistic market, thus many different parameters are considered. Taking into 
account that the problem is really complex from a mathematical point of view, the results 
are obtained by simulation. This kind of approach using computational tools to analyse a 
problem is very often in engineering problems because of their mathematical complexity 
and it has been also used to analyse economic problems as markets based on auction 
mechanisms. For instance, (Sancho et al., 2008) provide a simulation framework to analyse 
competitive electricity markets, (Atkins et al., 2007) provide an agent based computational 
framework to study large commodity markets or (Mehlenbacher, 2009) studies signal 
averaging in English auctions using a multi-agent system. Additionally, some 
computational experience is reported to illustrate what kind of results we could obtain. 
Finally, we would like to point out that other related papers are (Feng et al., 2007), who 
focused their analysis on how to improve the seller’s expected revenue by enforcing a 
reserve price in ranked items auctions, and (Sancho et al., 2009), who deal with auction 
situations arising from Internet search service providers but considering a cooperative 
approach. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide a description of the 
Internet ranking auction situation and introduce the main parameters involved in the 
problem. In Section 3 we introduce software tool, describe its main elements and how it 
works. Furthermore we include some computational experience. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Brief description of the Internet ranking auction 
In this section we formally introduce the Internet ranking auction situation and the 
parameters we use in the developed software tool for analysing such situations. Our 
approach involves analysing the problem from a competitive point of view, i.e., we are 
considering that the firms will compete to obtain a better position on the list because that is 
profitable for them. The position of a firm on the list will depend on the money each firm 
agrees to pay per click and, hence, the strategies of the firms would be their possible bids 
and their goals being focused on maximizing their expected profit. 
In particular, we consider a multi-stage situation in which an arbitrary number, n, of firms, 
each owns a homepage, are planning to list their names (links) under the same group of 
keywords in order to obtain as many visits as possible. Indeed, each visitor is a potential 
client to buy their products or to contract their professional services. To this end, they resort 
to an Internet search service provider, as could be Google or Yahoo. As the firms are 
interested in being on the top of the list they should pay some amount of money to the 
Internet search service provider in order to avoid the usual ordering provided by the 
searching engine used by the Internet search service provider. Furthermore the Internet 
search service provider could vary the order of the firms on the list from one period to 
another according to the paid money by them. In this sense, we are considering different 
periods and thereby the problem is dynamic. 
We denote by T the total number of periods, t=0,…,T-1. And, we denote by tN  the total 
number of customers who use the aforementioned group of keywords to conduct a search in 
period t (day, hour, minute, etc.). Additionally, we denote by dtN  the total number of 
disloyal customers in period t, i.e., those who do not have a clear preference among all the 
firms on the list and therefore they can click any homepage link. Consequently, −t dtN N  
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will be the number of loyal customers in period t. We assume that loyal customers always 
visit only the site of their preferred firm. In this context, il  will represent the market share 
of firm i over the set of all loyal clients interested on that particular group of keywords. In 
other words, il  is the proportion of visits that firm i receives from all loyal customers (it is 
obvious that 
=
=∑n i
i 1
l 1 ).  
On the other hand, pj denotes the proportion of clicks from the disloyal customers that a 
firm in position j on the list will receive. In this way, if firm i is ranked in position j in period 
t then it will receive a total number of clicks in that period equals to the sum of the clicks 
received from its loyal customers and the clicks received from the disloyal customers, in 
formula 
 ( )it i t dt j dtc l N N p N= − + . (1) 
The unitary reward per customer of firm i in period t, when a customer clicks on the link to 
enter in its homepage i, is denoted here by θit . In order to obtain their position in period t, 
the firms have to make a bid. These bids are the amount of money that firms agree to pay for 
each click received. Finally, they achieve the position in the ranking corresponding to their 
bids taking into account that all submitted bids are arranged in decreasing order. Therefore, 
firm i must only make a single bid and their final profit will be given by  
 ( ) ( )( )it it i t dt j dtb l N N p Nθ − − + . (2) 
Therefore, we assume that firms pay for all clicks from both loyal and disloyal customers. 
Whereas the revenue for the provider is given by 
 ( )( )n it i t dt j dt
i 1
b l N N p N
=
− +∑ . (3) 
Other input which the Decision Support System uses is the average expense that any 
customer spends for each click to the firms’ homepages. It is denoted here as e. However a 
customer not always spends that money when she enters in the homepage of a firm, 
therefore there is uncertainty about the expense happens or not and so we will denote by π  
the probability of such expense happens. 
Since firm i does not have information on the proportion of clicks that a firm receives from 
the disloyal customers, we assume that each firm i has a private forecast, fijt, about jp  in 
period t. In practice, all these estimations can be obtained by each firm using whatever 
market information and statistical tool at its disposal. Additionally, we assume that the 
private forecast of each firm can be updated over time with the new information obtained 
from the previous periods. For this reason, we use the subscript t to highlight that fijt is the 
firm i estimation of jp  obtained with the information available for firm i until period t. 
Finally, after receiving all the bids in period t, the Internet service provider announces the 
ranking and the bid of each firm for this period and so on. Since the bids are revealed in 
period t, each firm has incentives to submit a new bid for period t+1 in order to try to 
change or keep its position in the ranking, i.e., the order at which the firm appears on the 
list. 
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3. Fundamentals and development of the Decision Support System for 
Internet ranking auctions 
Based on the above description of the Internet ranking auction situation, we have 
implemented a software tool, using C++ Builder 6, which we have tried to reflect the reality 
of the firms’ bids and carry out the ranking of these bids, considering also the dynamic 
component of the situation. 
The uncertainty about the number of clicks for each position has been modelled through the 
private forecasts fijt. And both the forecasts and other parameters will be updated over time 
by means of specific algorithms that we will explain below. 
On the other hand, we have resorted to simulation for analyzing the firms’ behaviour. The 
reason is not hard to see. Considering more than two firms and three strategies leads to a 
mathematically intractable scenario and therefore the simulation approach seems suitable 
and reasonable to deal with. 
3.1 General outline of the application 
The developed and implemented Decision Support System works taking into account the 
risk profiles defined for each firm which participes in the ranking auction, the total number 
of customers (loyal and disloyal), the average expense per click, the proportion of clicks per 
position, the average reward for each firm, the private forecasts and the number of periods 
to be simulated. Once all necessary inputs to start the simulation have been introduced, 
which constitute the inicial working conditions, the implementation cycle is the following.  
(a) Storing inputs. The system stores information about firms; customers; expenses; number 
of simulations; number of periods to be simulated; and bids. 
(b) Computation of the variables of interest. When the parameters which are necessary to start 
the simulation have been introduced into the system, the number of total customers is 
obtained through simulation. Then, for each customer, the system determines whether she is 
loyal or disloyal. If she is loyal, the system determines to which firm. In any case, by 
simulation, the system obtains the values of all variables necessary to run on the simulation. 
If we are in the first period (t=0), then the system simulates all the bids with the initial 
information introduced into the system and ranks the firms. All this information is then 
saved. If we are in a general intermediate period t, before simulating the firms’ bids, the 
system updates itθ  and fijt for all firms using the information obtained from previous 
periods and then it simulates the firms’ bids and ranks them. 
(c) Presentation of results. Once the system has simulated the target period, all obtained data 
are reported in a practical and friendly format such as spreadsheets, which allow us to store 
on the hard disk the results of all simulations carried out. The results are sorted in different 
spreadsheets showing with tables and figures the following information: bit, itθ , e, fijt and cit 
for each period t, t=0,…,T-1, which we consider relevant to analyse a particular Internet 
ranking auction situation. This way in which the simulation results are presented eases to 
analyse them using the different mathematical and statistical utilities that the most of 
spreadsheets usually have. 
Figure 1 shows the flow chart which represents and summarises the operating model of the 
application we are describing. We can observe that the general structure of the application is 
very simple consisting basically of two consecutive cycles, one for the customers’ behaviour 
and another for the firms’ bids. 
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Fig. 1. The flow chart which represents the operating model of the application 
Inputs
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We should also describe the main aspects of the software developed. One advantage of this 
system is the clarity which the different parameters are dealt with, and also its easy use. The 
software consists of a graphic and intuitive interface through which the user can introduce 
all the parameters necessary to carry out the simulation of an Internet ranking auction. This 
interface consists of only one window (see Figure 2) in which the main parts of the 
application with very different characteristics are shown. In the following subsections we 
will show and explain in detail each of these parts. Finally, another advantage of this 
software tool is the presentation of the results in spreadsheets, because, as we said before, it 
eases the posterior analysis of the obtained results from the simulation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The main application window. [Analisis estrategico del servicio de busqueda por 
Internet basado en sistemas de subastas (Strategic analysis of the Internet search service 
based on auction systems), funcionamiento (starting conditions), empresas (firms), pujas 
(bids), leales (loyals), desleales (disloyals), gasto (expense), probab. compra (purchase 
probability), cuota mercado (market share), nuevos datos (new data), salir (exit), datos 
buscador (search service provider data), beneficio medio por clic (average profit per click), 
estima de (estimation of)] 
3.2 Parts of the Decision Support System 
3.2.1 System variables 
This part allows us to configure the internal operations of the Decision Support System. 
First, we have to enter as an input the number of firms (the limit depends on the features of 
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the computer in which we are running the software). Other necessary inputs are the number 
of simulations and the number of periods to simulate. The first input is related to the times 
in which the system repeats the calculations to determine suitable values for different 
parameters. Specifically, the system tries to estimate the probability of being in any position 
of the ranking conditioned to a particular submitted bid. Nevertheless, this process will be 
shown in detail later on. 
3.2.2 Bids 
In this part we need to introduce two parameters. The first one is related to the reserve price, 
which the provider can impose in the ranking auction. In many instances, providers (sellers, in 
general) reserve the right to not provide the service if the price determined in the auction is 
lower than some threshold. This threshold amount is called “the reserve price”. The system 
takes into account this possibility. Obviously, if such reserve price does not exist, then we must 
only introduce a value zero for this parameter. The second parameter is the amount that must 
be added to the reserve price to build the set of feasible bids. Let us denote this amount as Δ . 
Therefore the minimum feasible bid will be the reserve price, r, the maximum feasible bid 
will be the unitary reward, itθ , and the possible bids in between will be calculated as r+k Δ , 
k=1,2,…,K where K is an integer number such that ( )itK r≤ θ − Δ . 
3.2.3 Customers 
We must also enter as an input the total number of customers who use the Internet service 
each period t. To this end, we introduce into the system this parameter modeled by a 
Gaussian distribution of mean μc  and standard deviation σc , therefore we are considering 
the possibility that the number of customers is not constant along the number of periods under 
consideration. For each period t, the system simulates an execution of a Gaussian distribution 
( )μ σc cN ,  and, afterwards, rounds off this value to obtain an integer number of customers. 
Additionally, it is necessary to introduce into the system the percentage of loyal and disloyal 
customers in the (simulated) market. We assume that this information is shared for all the 
participating firms in the auction. 
Finally, we have a button to add information about the firms’ market shares, li. All these 
inputs will be used for the system, by simulation, to determine the total number of 
customers, the disloyal clients and the number of loyal clients for each firm. 
3.2.4 Expenses 
The main aim of this part is to provide estimations of the customers’ expenses, once they 
have clicked on a particular homepage. In order to obtain this information, we have to enter 
as an input the probability of a customer purchasing the product or contracting the service 
from any firm on the list. If, finally, a customer purchases the product, then it is necessary to 
know how much she spends. For this reason, we introduce into the system the amount of 
expense per client modeled again by a Gaussian distribution ( )μ σe eN , . All these 
parameters will be used later in the simulation stage. 
3.2.5 Clicks per position on the list 
It is necessary to introduce into the system information on the proportion of clicks that a 
firm receives from the disloyal clients when a firm is ranked in position j, pj, for all j=1,…,n. 
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In this framework, we assume that these parameters depend solely on the ranking. In 
addition, we point out that pj, for all j=1,…,n, is private information of the Internet search 
service provider. Consequently, the firms, through whatever market information gathering 
techniques at its disposal, need to have a private forecast, fijt, about the parameter pj. These 
estimations help firms to make a decision about what bid to submit in each period t. Our 
system updates the private forecasts over time from the number of clicks obtained in the 
positions at which firms appear in each of the simulated periods. 
The system also allows us to simulate that the Internet search service provider discloses 
information on pj, for all j=1,…,n, to the firms so as to check whether this strategy 
encourages them to bid more aggressively or not. The question, in this case, is to verify 
whether reducing the uncertainty on the number of clicks per position on the list implies 
that firms bid more aggressively. 
3.2.6 Information about firms 
3.2.6.1 Data 
As for the part of the framework devoted to the firms, we need to enter as an input the 
unitary reward per customer and the private forecast of pj for each firm in period t=0, i.e., 
i0θ  and fij0, respectively (see Figure 3).  
In our system i0θ  has been characterized as a trapezoidal fuzzy number (A,B,C,D). 
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce these four parameters. We use a trapezoidal fuzzy 
number to represent the (imperfect) knowledge of the firm about the unitary reward per 
customer. 
In the first period, t=0, the system simulates a value for i0θ  from the fuzzy number. Later, 
the system will update the reward per customer over time, itθ , t=1,…,T-1, using information 
about the customer’s expenses and other variables involved in the problem. We should also 
point out that i0θ  could be defined as a crisp number. To this end, it would be enough to 
consider A=B=C=D. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Part of the application devoted to the firm 1. [Empresa (firm), beneficio medio por clic 
(average profit per click), centimos de u.m. (cents of monetary unit), Estima de (estimation 
of)] 
On the other hand, the system needs information about the estimation of the percentage of 
clicks per position for each firm. In other words, we have to introduce into the system the 
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perceived percentage of disloyal clients who will visit the firm’s homepage depending on 
the position at which it appears on the list, i.e., fij0. We note that this parameter is defined 
only for the first period to simulate, t=0, because after that initial period, the system 
automatically updates it over time for each firm obtaining the value of fijt, for all t=1,…,T-1. 
The strategies of the firms can vary from one period to another as a consequence of the 
updated perceived estimations of fijt since the firms will bid more aggressively to obtain 
positions with higher fijt, i.e., to obtain more visits and hence a higher expected profit. 
3.2.6.2 Risk aversion and behaviour 
Other data we have to enter as an input is the risk profile of firm i, i=1,…,n, and at the same 
time the risk profile of firm k (k=1,…,i-1,i+1,…,n) following the perception of firm i about it. 
Obviously firms’ risk profile is directly related to the shape of the utility function of each 
firm. We denote here the utility function of firm i by UFi. Following von Neumann-
Morgenstern tradition (see (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)), a firm i is risk averse if 
UFi is a convex function, risk neutral if UFi is a linear function and risk loving if UFi is a 
concave function. In particular, in this software we assume that UFi is a square root function 
for the first case, the identity function for the second case and, finally, a square function for the 
third case. Particularly, in our system we have modeled a more general situation. We allow 
firms to behave in a different way over time. In other words, in a period t firm i could behave 
as a risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving player depending on a probability distribution. We 
have to enter into the system as an input this distribution for each firm i, i=1,…,n (see Figure 
4). In a similar manner, for running, the system needs the perception of firm i about the risk 
profile of each firm k, k=1,…,i-1,i+1,…,n (see Figure 5). So, the system in each period will 
simulate a value from the risk profile to determine the type of the utility function of each firm. 
Therefore we are considering that a firm to make a decision not only takes into account its risk 
profile but also its perception about the risk profiles of its competitors. 
3.3 Main algorithms implemented 
In this section we show the main algorithms that have been implemented with the task of 
calculating the number of loyal and disloyal customers and their expenses, the firms’ bids, 
the ranking in each period, the updates values for the private forecasts of the clicks per 
position, the parameters of the fuzzy numbers, etc. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Risk profile of the firm. [Empresa (firm), perfil de riesgo (risk profile), alto (high), 
neutron (neutral), bajo (low), otras empresas (other firms)] 
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Fig. 5. Perception of firm 1 about the risk profile of the rest of competitors. [Perfil de riesgo 
(risk profile), empresa (firm), evaluacion de la empresa 1 sobre las demas empresas 
(perception of firm 1 about the risk profile of the rest of firms), alto (high), neutro (neutral), 
bajo (low), aceptar (OK), cancelar (cancel)] 
3.3.1 Loyal and disloyal customers 
Here we are going only to show the algorithm used for a disloyal client because the case of a 
loyal client requires an easier algorithm. 
For any period t, once the system has simulated a value for the total number of customers 
who are going to use the Internet search service in that period, we need to know whether 
each customer is loyal or disloyal. To this end, we make use of the information previously 
introduced into the system (see Section 3.2.3) about the percentage of loyal and disloyal 
clients in the market. So, we simulate a random variable, which simply follows a Bernoulli 
distribution B(p) where p is the probability to be loyal, that determines whether a customer 
q is or not loyal. If q is, finally, a loyal customer then, using the firms’ market shares, li, we 
can determine, by simulating an execution of the multinomial distribution M(l1, l2, …, ln), 
which is her preferred firm among all the participants on the list. 
Now, let us assume that a particular customer q is disloyal. Then, the system follows the 
algorithm described in Figure 6. In particular, for each position on the list j, j=1,..,n, the 
system simulates an execution of a uniform random variable Uj[0,1], we call this execution 
by uj. After that, if uj is lower than pj (the proportion of clicks associated to the position j) 
then the system understands that the disloyal customer q clicks on the homepage which 
appears in position j, otherwise the system considers that customer q does not click it. On 
the other hand, we assume that a disloyal customer could click on all the homepages on the 
list if she is willing to, unlike loyal customers which only click on their preferred firm’s 
homepage. Therefore, the sum of all pj, j=1,2,…,n, could greater than 1. 
When uj is lower than pj for a position j, then the system simulates the amount of money that 
customer q spends in the firm which appears at position j. We note that both the probability 
of clicking, purchasing and how much to spend in the site do not depend on which firm is 
but the first probability depends on the position while the others two are always the same 
for all customers, firms and positions. Therefore, in this sense, the position on the list plays a 
crucial role in our approach because it makes the difference in the expected revenues of the 
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firms. However, once a customer enters in a homepage her behaviour is not affected by the 
position, the firm or anything else. Consequently, the important question in this setting is 
whether a customer clicks or not the link to enter in a site. 
Regarding the algorithm to simulate the expenses of customer q, let us suppose that uj<pj, 
i.e., customer q clicks on the homepage placed in position j. Then, the system simulates an 
execution of a uniform random variable over the interval [0,1]. If the obtained value is lower 
than the probability of purchasing (introduced previously into the system as an input), it 
means that the customer q will spend his money on the products of the firm which appears 
in position j. Afterwards, the system simulates the expenses by means of an execution of a 
Gaussian distribution ( )e eN ,μ σ  (see Section 3.2.3). 
Finally, the system saves for each customer q the positions on the list she visited and the 
expenses she spent in each visited position. 
 
 
Fig. 6. The flow chart of the function for the disloyal customers 
The algorithm for loyal customers only consists of the expenses part of the algorithm for 
disloyal customers for this reason it is omitted. Furthermore, we note loyal customers only 
spend money in their preferred firms’ homepages while disloyal customers could spend 
money in several or all firms’ homepages. On the other hand, it is nevertheless true that we 
could have considered that the probability of purchasing and/or spending change when a 
t=0
Click on j
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No
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num. clicks(j)
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e=0
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previous purchases has been done but the present approach is enough for our purposes and 
that extension or modification is left for further versions of this software tool. In fact, this 
modification would stress more the role of the position in this kind of situations. 
3.3.2 Updating process 
This process involves modifying the value of the variables that change over time. The firms’ 
strategies can vary depending on the value of the simulated parameters in previous periods, 
since it is important for them to improve their estimations on the parameters used for them 
to make a bid. Therefore firms update their information available incorporating the data 
obtained from the previous periods in order to improve their knowledge about some system 
parameters relevant for them. In this section, we briefly show which parameters are updated 
by the firms and, additionally, how this process is carried out. 
The parameters that we consider relevant for the firms from a strategic point of view, and 
hence they will be modified period by period, are the following: fijt , the estimation of the 
percentage of clicks per position, and itθ , the unitary reward per customer who clicks on 
firm i’s homepage.  
Regarding estimations fijt, the Internet search service provider knows the real value of the 
percentage of clicks per position on the list, pj, j=1,…,n. However, each firm at the end of 
period t only knows the number of received clicks on its homepage with absolute certainty. 
Therefore, firm i in position j at the end of period t can just update the estimation fijt+1. This 
new estimation can be calculated as the percentage of received clicks from the disloyal 
customers, i.e, we compute the ratio of the number of disloyal clients who click on firm i’s 
homepage to the total number of disloyal clients. In order to know the number of clicks due 
to disloyal customers, we calculate the total number of clicks (from loyal and disloyal 
clients) minus the number of clicks from loyal customers. Firm i knows the total number of 
clicks received after playing period t, denoted by cit, because each firm has a counter on its 
homepage. And the number of clicks from loyal customers to firm i is calculated by 
multiplying the total number of customers who visited the Internet search service in period 
t, Nt, times the proportion of loyal customers in the market and, finally, times the market 
share of firm i. It is worth to note that we consider Nt is common knowledge to all firms, 
because we assume that the search service provider publishes this information when the 
auction for period t is over. This assumption is not restrictive since it is important for the 
search service provider to advertise the number of customers using its search services in 
order to attract more firms over all when Nt is large enough. 
As a consequence of the previous calculation, firm i has a first new estimation fijt+1 on pj, it 
will be denoted as fijt+1(1). Nevertheless, we assume that each firm can improve the accuracy 
of the estimation fijt+1(1). To do that, we will use the previous estimation fijt on pj. First, we 
define a discrepancy index (DI) for measuring the difference between fijt+1(1) and, the 
previous estimation, fijt: 
 DI=|fijt - fijt+1(1)|/fijt+1(1)  (4) 
Depending on the value of DI, the system will weight each one of these estimations on pj to 
build a new compound forecast. We only distinguish three cases: 
Case 1: DI<=0.25 
In this case, both fijt and fijt+1(1) have relevant information about the real percentage of clicks 
for position j on the list. Therefore we consider that both estimations on pj are equally 
credible. So, we update the estimation of fijt+1 by the following expression. 
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 fijt+1=(fijt + fijt+1(1))/2  (5) 
Case 2: 0.25<DI<=0.5 
In this case, fijt and fijt+1(1) are a little different. In this case we consider more credible 
estimation fijt+1(1) than estimation fijt. Therefore, we use a weight of 2/3 for fijt+1(1) and a 
weight of 1/3 for fijt to capture this feeling on the estimations. In this way, we have to 
calculate: 
 fijt+1=(2fijt + fijt+1(1))/3  (6) 
Case 3: DI>0.5 
This is the more extreme case. Here fijt and fijt+1(1) are clearly different. In this case, fijt is very 
far to the estimation obtained with the data of period t, i.e., fijt+1(1). Therefore we consider 
that estimation fijt+1(1) is much more credible than estimation fijt. Hence, we update firm i’s 
estimation on pj exclusively with the value of fijt+1(1). 
 fijt+1=fijt+1(1)  (7) 
Overall, the updating process is carried out to update the firms’ private forecasts of the 
percentage of clicks per position. Given the available information that firm i has at the end 
of period t, we exclusively update the estimation of fijt+1, where j is the position at which the 
firm i appears on the list during that period. It means that we will use the previous forecasts 
fikt, where k=1,…,j-1,j+1,…n, to estimate fikt+1 because firm i does not have new information 
about those positions. Therefore, each firm is able to update the information about only one 
position at the end of each period. On the other hand, it is not difficult to modify the 
software tool in order to consider another procedure or additional cases to update 
estimations fijt. 
It is worth to note that the system allows us to simulate a situation where the search service 
provider publishes the real parameters, i.e., pj, j=1,…,n. Due to that option, we can study the 
behaviour of the firms (regarding their bids) when they have more and better information 
about the relevance of the different positions for their interests. 
On the other hand, as we said above, other parameters that will be modified over time are 
itθ ’s, i.e., the unitary reward per customer who clicks on firms’ homepages. Remember that 
itθ  is modeled in this system as a trapezoidal fuzzy number (Ait, Bit, Cit, Dit). Regarding this, 
in order to update itθ  period by period, the system will revise separately each one of the 
four parameters Ait, Bit, Cit and Dit. Obviously, this updating process depends on the money 
spent by the customers in the firms’ homepages. We know that the gross revenue obtained 
by the firm i at the end of period t will coincide with the loyal and disloyal customers’ 
expenses. Then, in order to obtain the reward per click, we calculate the ratio of the gross 
revenue to the total number of clicks. We will denote this value by θitˆ . The system uses θitˆ  
as a tool to update the four parameters defining the trapezoidal fuzzy number. Specifically, 
the system uses the following expressions: 
 Ait+1=0.9Ait+0.1 θitˆ   (8) 
 Bit+1=0.9Bit+0.1 θitˆ   (9) 
 Cit+1=0.9Cit+0.1 θitˆ   (10) 
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 Dit+1=0.9Dit+0.1 θitˆ   (11) 
Therefore, the reward per click corresponding to firm i at the end of period t will be 
modeled as a trapezoidal fuzzy number (Ait+1, Bit+1, Cit+1, Dit+1). So, the system will simulate 
a value from (Ait+1, Bit+1, Cit+1, Dit+1) to determine an estimation of the new reward per click 
+θit 1 . We note that for the rewards per click we consider a position more conservative than 
for the percentage of clicks per position on the list, i.e., the firms update more slowly their 
estimations on the reward per click. However, as in the previous updating algorithm, it is 
not difficult to modify the software tool to consider another procedure of updating the 
rewards per click, for example, following the same idea as in the case of the percentage of 
clicks per position on the list. This kind of possibility provides certain flexibility to the 
software tool implemented with respect to consider other additional situations not included 
in the version presented in this chapter. 
3.3.3 Bids 
In this section we show how the system assesses a finite set of feasible bids for each firm in 
order to determine their optimal bid. The optimal bid will be the feasible bid which 
maximizes expected value of the utility function of the evaluated firm. In order to determine 
the optimal bid of firm i, i=1,…,n, the system carries out several steps. 
First of all, we need to define the risk profile for firm i. Also, we have to specify the number 
of bids that firm i will consider as feasible to submit to the Internet search service provider. 
The system will select one of these bids as the optimal one for firm i in period t according to 
its utility function UFi. 
Secondly, we have to determine the probability of appearing in each position j on the list, for 
all j=1,…,n, once the firm has submitted a particular bid. This process is carried out for each 
one of the feasible bids for firm i, for all i=1,…,n. 
Third, we calculate the expected value of the utility function for each one of the feasible 
bids. In this set, a bid is chosen so as to maximize the expected utility, following our 
assumptions. Roughly speaking, this is the procedure to determine the optimal strategy for 
firm i.  
Obviously, this process is carried out for each period t, t=0,…,T-1, and for each firm i, 
i=1,…,n, obtaining the simulated bids and the ranking list for each period. 
Overall, the determination of the optimal bid depends on the risk profile, the average 
reward per click, the private forecast about the number of clicks per position, and the 
perception that each firm has about the rest of competitors, as we show next. 
Step 0. The system executes a realization of the trapezoidal fuzzy number (Ait, Bit, Cit, Dit) to 
obtain an average reward per unit itθ  to be used in the following steps. 
Step 1. Let us assume that we are working with firm i in period t. A similar process is 
performed for all periods and all participating firms in the ranking auction. 
The system simulates the risk profile for the firm (see Section 3.2.6.2). So, we obtain an 
integer number, 0, 1 or 2, corresponding to a risk loving, a risk neutral or a risk averse 
player, respectively. Once the system has simulated the risk profile, we know how firm i 
will behave. Nevertheless, we need to know the set of feasible bids as well. 
Step 2. Following the inputs introduced into the system and the values obtained in the 
previous steps, the number of feasible bids will be K+1, where K is an integer number such 
that ( )itK r≤ θ − Δ  (see Section 3.2.2). In particular, the set of feasible bids is obtained by 
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means of the simple expression + Δr k , where =k 0,1,...,K . The number of bids to be 
evaluated can be as greater as one likes because the tool allows us to choose the minimum 
amount Δ  to be considered (see Section 3.2.2). 
Step 3. Once we know the set of feasible bids and the risk profile, we have to determine the 
probability of appearing in each position on the list since a firm is not able to know its 
position on the list before submitting a particular bid. Therefore, in particular, we are 
interested in determining the corresponding probability distribution associated to each 
feasible bid bit. We will use this probability distribution to calculate the expected value of 
the utility function given bid bit. 
Obviously, firm i’s profit not only depends on firm i’s bid but also on the bids of the rest of 
competitors. Therefore, it is also necessary that the firm assumes a certain kind of behaviour 
for each of its competitors. 
In order to make clear the above point, we first show the expression of the expected value of 
the utility function given bid bit for firm i: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
=
= θ − − +∑ni i it it i t dt ijt dt it
j 1
E UF UF b l N N f N P j/b ,   (12) 
where P(j/bit) denotes the probability of appearing in position j after submitting the feasible 
bid bit. 
Taking into account that computing mathematically the above probabilities is almost 
intractable, we will approximate them by simulation. To this end, we will use the ratio of the 
number of times that firm i has appeared in position j, after submitting bit, to the total 
number of simulations. In other words, the system simulates an auction as many times as 
the user introduced into the system. In each auction, firm i will always submit the same bid 
bit, and will keep fix the same risk profile. Regarding the competitors, the process is more 
sophisticated. First, the system simulates a value from the fuzzy number of firm i θit (k), for 
all k=1,…,i-1,i+1,…,n, in order to obtain the average reward per click which each competitor 
use. Secondly, the system multiplies that realization of θit (k) times a factor which depends 
on the perception of firm i about the risk profile of each firm k. This factor has been modeled 
in the system by a Beta(a,b) distribution. The parameters a and b have been defined in a 
different way depending on the kind of risk profile of the firm. If the firm is risk averse then 
we consider a=2 and b=3. If the firm is risk neutral then we consider a=3 and b=3. And if the 
firm is risk loving then a=3 and b=2 (other values for parameters a and b could be easily 
considered just modifying the corresponding part of the code). In this way, the probability 
density function is asymmetric with a high left tail, symmetric, and asymmetric with a high 
right tail, respectively, following the natural bidding behaviour of the firms. Finally, the 
system builds the bid of competitor k, k=1,…,i-1,i+1,…,n, by means of the following 
expressions 
 bkt= θit (k)·Exc(Beta(ak,bk)),  (13) 
where Exc(Beta(ak,bk)) is an execution of the distribution Beta(ak,bk). 
We note that we consider that each firm knows neither the average reward per unit of the 
others nor a particular estimation on them, therefore they use their own knowledge about 
the average reward per unit to evaluate the possible averages reward per unit which can be 
used by their competitors. In some sense, each firm considers that its knowledge on the 
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average reward per unit is good enough and the other firms have the same (or very similar) 
information about that. 
Step 4. The system calculates the expected value of the utility function, (12), for the bid bit. 
This procedure is repeated for each feasible bid for firm i. In this way, the system is able to 
select the optimal bid, i.e., the feasible bid with the highest expected value of the utility 
function. 
To end this section, it is worth noting that all firms that participate in the auction submit 
their optimal bids. So, the system ranks the firms in descending order according to all these 
bids. Consequently, the system is able to build a list for each period t, t=0,…,T-1. 
3.4 Some computational experience 
In order to show how the system works we use two stylized and simple examples one with 
only two firms and another with five firms. In the first case, the example has the following 
characteristics: 
 
Inputs Value 
Num. of firms 2 
Num. Simulations 1000 
Num. of periods 10 
Num. Customers N(1000,5) 
% disloyals 100% 
Prob. of purchasing 0.2 
Expenses 1 € 
Reserve price 5 cent/€ 
Δ  0.1 
p1 0.9 
p2 0.2 
Table 1. Example with two firms 
In this first example, we work with only two risk neutral firms, during a period of 10 days, 
assuming that all the customers which visit the Internet search engine are disloyal, the 
probability of purchasing is 0.2 and when a customer makes the decision of purchasing her 
expenses is constant and equals to 1€. On the other hand, the proportion of clicks received if 
the firm is ranked first clearly higher than if the firm is ranked second. Also, we assume that 
both firms are symmetric. In other words, both present the same features. In particular, the 
starting average reward per click is modelled by means of the trapezoidal fuzzy number (17, 
17.5, 19.5, 20.0). Regarding the private forecasts about the number of clicks per position on 
the list, we consider that the firms’ estimations deviate significantly from the actual value of 
the parameters, p1 and p2. In particular, we consider that f110=f120=f210=f220=0.5, therefore, the 
firms evaluate that the position is not relevant to obtain more clicks and hence a higher 
expected revenue. Therefore, one could expect that the firms bid for the first day the reserve 
price to appear on the list in whatever position. Finally, we assume that each firm believes 
that its rival is risk neutral as well. 
In Figure 7 the bidding strategy for each firm over time is shown. As it can be seen, on the 
first day, both firms submit the reserve price as optimal bids as one could expect without 
any analysis. As it was noted before, it is due to the fact that the number of clicks the firms 
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will receive if they are ranked first or second is little sensitive. In other words, the firms 
think that they will receive the same number of visits independently on the position at 
which they appear. Therefore, they have little incentives to bid aggressively. However, since 
the private forecasts about these parameters change over time (see Figure 8, for Firm 2 we 
obtained a similar figure) showing increasingly the importance to be ranked first on the list, 
the firms bid more aggressively. In some way, they are having additional information about 
the real number of visits per position and it allows them to improve the forecast accuracy of 
pj, j=1,2. Since p1>>p2 the firms have incentives to bid higher.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
periods
b
id
s firm 1
firm 2
 
Fig. 7. Bids of the two firms for the studied period 
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Fig. 8. Evolution of Firm 1’s private forecasts about pj 
www.intechopen.com
 Decision Support Systems 
 
278 
Finally, from Figure 7 and Figure 8 we can observe that the optimal bid for both firms after 
the ten periods is approximately 10 cents and in few periods the firms have a reasonable 
good estimation on the parameters p1 and p2. 
In order to show how the system works under more competition, we consider a second 
example with five firms. The particular characteristics of this numerical example are shown 
in the following table: 
 
Inputs Value 
Num. of firms 5 
Num. Simulations 1000 
Num. of periods 10 
Num. Customers N(1000,5) 
% disloyals 100% 
Prob. of purchasing 0.2 
Expenses 1 € 
Reserve price 5 cent/€ 
Δ 0.1 
p1 0.9 
p2 0.7 
p3 0.3 
p4 0.2 
p5 0.1 
Table 2. Example with five firms 
Apart from the characteristics given in Table 2, we also assume that the five firms are risk 
neutral and symmetric again. In particular, we modelled θkt  by the trapezoidal fuzzy 
number (17, 17.5, 19.5, 20). On the other hand, the private forecasts about pj, j=1,…,5, will be 
0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1, respectively. It is worth noting that in this second example the 
starting estimations are more realistic than in the previous example. It should imply that 
firms use a more aggressive bidding strategy from the first period, t=0. 
Next in Figure 9 we show the information about the bids submitted to the system for each 
firm period by period. We observe that the optimal bid for firms after the ten periods 
analysed is close to 12. 
In this case, the value of the parameters encourages aggressive bidding even in the first 
period. Unlike the previous example, the firms submitted a bid strictly greater than the 
reserve price in period t=0. Note also that in the final periods the average bid with five firms 
is greater than the average bid with two firms. Obviously, it is consequence of the intrinsic 
competition of both examples. 
Regarding the estimation of pj, each firm learnt over time about the real proportion of clicks 
per position. In this way, at the last period, the private forecasts about these parameters are 
very close to the actual values (see Figure 10). 
It is worth noting that the system generates more information about the auction over time 
than the above presented. For example, number of clicks received, expenses related to the 
customers, the evolution of the reward per click, etc. Once the simulation has been 
completed, all the data obtained are presented in a practical format such as spreadsheets, 
which allows us to store on the hard disk the results of all the simulations carried out. 
Nevertheless, we only wanted to show briefly some of the results that the developed 
software is able to yield. 
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Fig. 9. Bids of the five firms for the studied period 
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Fig. 10. Evolution of Firm 1’s private forecasts about pj 
4. Conclusions and further research 
The main objective of this work has been to develop a simple software tool in the form of a 
Decision Support System or computational framework for analysing ranking auction 
markets for Internet search service providers which could be useful for economic scholars or 
practitioners. The particular features of this tool make possible to simulate in a clear and 
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simple way the bidding behaviour of a set of firms when facing ranking auctions situation 
on the Internet. 
This tool could be interesting for analysing different aspects of Internet search engines. In 
particular, the tool provides information about how the Internet search engine could induce 
firms to bid more aggressively, or whether it is beneficial for the provider to disclose more 
information regarding the number of clicks per position to the firms, the effect of collusion 
or coordination, etc. On the other hand, the software tool has been implemented to give the 
possibility to modify easily some parts (in particular some algorithms) in order to consider 
other situations not included in the present version. 
We would like to finish mentioning some additional topics for further research on the 
Decision Support System considered in this chapter. First, we could use the software to 
check whether the results obtained by (Lim & Tang, 2006) for only two firms are correct for a 
greater number of firms. Secondly, we could analyse how a multiple period auction affects 
firms’ bidding strategies. Third, we could also study how collusion over time can distort the 
final results of the auction. Overall, we view our approach as a building block or framework 
for developing further analysis. 
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